This workshop is intended for researchers and doctoral students in economics who are interested in resource and environmental economics. The webinar is led by a team of researchers composed of Geir B. Asheim (Oslo University), Hassan Benchekroun (McGill University), Sophie Bernard (Polytechnique Montréal), Etienne Billette de Villemeur (Université de Lille, UQAM), Robert Cairns (McGill University), Justin Leroux (HEC Montréal), and Charles Séguin (UQAM).

This workshop on natural resource and environmental economics will host Cees Withagen, professor-emeritus of environmental economics at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Fellow of Tinbergen Institute and CentER (Tilburg University), and Simon Elgersma, PhD candidate at the University of Groningen.

→ This event will be in English.

• Cees Withagen (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Tinbergen Instituut en CESifo)
  Open-loop von Stackelberg in the cartel-fringe model with renewables
  Coauthored with Hassan Benchekroun (McGill University) and Gerard van der Meiden (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Tinbergen Instituut en CESifo)

Abstract

We consider the open-loop von Stackelberg equilibrium in the cartel-fringe model with renewables. Hence, the main contribution consists in extending the well-known cartel-versus-fringe model so as to include renewables. We also perform a  numerical welfare analysis.

• Simon Elgersma, PhD candidate at the University of Groningen
  Mitigation, Adaptation and Cooperation in Response to Climate Disaster

Abstract

We consider the tradeoff between mitigation and adaptation in a transboundary pollution game with an environmental regime shift. Countries can lower their emissions to decrease the likelihood that a regime shift takes place or proactively invest in adaptive capital to reduce the impact of the regime shift. We solve for the social planner outcome and the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE) and study how the option to adapt affects incentives to mitigate, precautionary behavior and welfare. In the social planner outcome, adaptation complements mitigation and increases welfare, but in the non-cooperative outcome adaptation crowds out mitigation and lowers welfare. Finally, we introduce efficient procedures to numerically calculate MPNE in differential games that cannot be solved analytically.